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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael D. Cornelsen appeals from the district court's decision affirming his 
conviction for battery following a bench trial in magistrate court. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Cornelsen was cited with battery under I.C. § 18-903 for kicking Ludwig 
Tomasini, a security officer at Kootenai Medical Center, against his will. (R., p.7.) 
After waiving a jury trial, Cornelsen was convicted of battery by the magistrate court. 
(R., pp.9-11, 17-27; Tr., pp.1-108.) The court sentenced Cornelsen to 180 days jail 
with 145 days suspended (30 days "unscheduled" and five actual days to serve), a 
$1000 fine (with $700 suspended), and placed him on supervised probation for two 
years. (R., pp.37-42.) Cornelsen appealed to the district court (R., pp.49-50), 
contending there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain a conviction, 
and after briefing and argument by counsel, 1 the court affirmed the magistrate 
court's verdict (R., pp.71-98). Cornelsen appeals from the district court's 
intermediate appellate opinion. (R., pp.99-102.) 
1 Cornelsen's attorney was permitted to withdraw prior to briefing, and the district 




Cornelsen states the issue on appeal as follows: 
1. Is there sufficient evidence to support the Magistrate's finding of guilt 
as to the charge of battery? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Cornelsen failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that there 
was sufficient evidence to sustain his battery conviction? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Concluded There Is Substantial Evidence In The Record 
To Support The Magistrate Judge's Verdict Finding Cornelsen Guilty Of Battery 
A. Introduction 
The district court, acting as an intermediate appellate court, determined that 
the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict Cornelsen of battery despite 
his claim of self-defense. (Appellate Tr., p.27, L.24 - p.28, L.17.) The district court 
concluded that, although the magistrate court did not discuss Cornelsen's claim of 
self-defense when it rendered its verdict, it "implicitly rejected [the] argument that Mr. 
Cornelsen was entitled to defend himself in the way that he did, and that he couldn't 
have found a battery otherwise." (Appellate Tr., p.28, Ls.1-17.) 
Cornelsen argues on appeal that the magistrate judge's verdict finding him 
guilty of battery by kicking Tomasini was not supported by sufficient evidence.2 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) Cornelsen specifically claims "there is no substantial 
evidence to indicate that the kick was not in self defense." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) 
Cornelsen's argument fails because there was substantial evidence presented at 
trial showing he kicked Tomasini, and that the kick was not done in self-defense. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
2 Apart from one passing reference to the district court, Cornelsen's Appellant's 
Brief does not discuss the district court's intermediate appellate decision. (See 
Appellant's Brief, p.9 ("The appellant's counsel would note that the Magistrate and 
the District Court seemed concerned with the status and immunity of Tomasini as a 
security guard.").) 
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decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 Ct. App. 2008) 
(citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005)). The appellate 
court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial 
and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kl "If those findings are 
so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed 
the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court's decision as 
a matter of procedure." 19.:. (citing Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. 
Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981 )). 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a 
jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 
Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 
P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review the appellate court will 
not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight 
to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 
101, 822 P .2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991 ); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in 
favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; Hart, 
112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
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C. The Evidence Supports Cornelsen's Conviction For Battery 
Cornelsen has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the district 
court erred in finding the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of 
committing a battery upon Tomasini. 3 The trial testimony of Tomasini and a patient 
registrar, Kaylee Nowland, provided the magistrate judge with sufficient evidence 
upon which to conclude that Cornelsen kicked Tomasini while Tomasini was legally 
escorting him out of the hospital as a trespasser, and not in self-defense.4 
3 Battery is defined by I.C. § 18-903 as any: 
(a) Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of 
another; or 
(b) Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another 
person against the will of the other; or 
(c) Unlawfully and intentionally causing bodily harm to an individual. 
4 Because Cornelsen's trail counsel argued at trial that Cornelsen did not recall 
kicking Tomasini, but if he did, it was in self-defense (Tr., p.100, L.25-p.101, L.10), 
in order for Cornelsen to be found guilty of battery the state had to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Cornelsen's actions were not in self-defense. Idaho Criminal 
Jury Instruction ("ICJI") 1517 states in relevant part: 
A battery is justifiable if the defendant was acting in self-
defense. 
In order to find that the defendant acted in self-defense, all of 
the following conditions must be found to have been in existence at the 
time of the striking: 
1. The defendant must have believed that the defendant was in 
imminent danger of bodily harm. 
2. In addition to that belief, the defendant must have believed that the 
action the defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from 
the danger presented. 
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable person, 
under similar circumstances, would have believed that the defendant 
was in imminent danger of bodily injury and believed that the action 
taken was necessary. 
5 
Tomasini testified that, as a security officer for Kootenai Medical Center, his 
duties included responding to problems involving irritated or unhappy persons. (Tr., 
p.2, L.25 - p.3, L.23.) On July 9, 2010, while on duty, he walked through the 
emergency room area of the hospital and noticed Cornelsen was talking to a lady 
loudly and was swearing. (Tr., p.5, Ls.10-25.) About twenty minutes later, Tomasini 
walked by the admitting desks in the emergency room and heard Cornelsen "yelling 
that he wanted some f-ing medical attention right now." (Tr., p.6, L.15 - p.7, L.6.) 
Cornelsen was yelling, swearing, and demanding medical attention, saying, "I want 
some fuckin' medical attention right now, and just usin' the F-word quite a bit[,]" as 
he directed his comments to Nowland, who was sitting behind an admitting desk. 
(Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.3; p.28, Ls.8-10.) Tomasini feared Cornelsen might "pick up 
somethin' and start swingin' it at people[,]"5 so he informed Cornelsen that he was a 
security officer and that "[Cornelsen] needed to get out of the hospital." (Tr., p.7, 
Ls.9-16.) Cornelsen responded to Tomasini's multiple orders to get out of the 
4. The defendant must have acted only in response to that danger and 
not for some other motivation. 
5. When there is no longer any reasonable appearance of danger, the 
right of self-defense ends. 
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the battery was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt 
whether the battery was justifiable, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
(Adapted to the crime of battery and self-defense (vis-a-vis defense of another).) 
5 According to Tomasini, there were other people waiting in the emergency room 
area during this time. (Tr., p.9, Ls.13-15.) 
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hospital with "pretty much a Fuck you. No." (Tr., p.8, Ls.19-20.) Tomasini intended 
to take Cornelsen out of the hospital because he did not know what he was going to 
do, and to "see exactly what the whole problem was and talk to him and ... maybe 
help him resolve his problem." (Tr., p.9, Ls.3-9.) 
Tomasini told Cornelsen that if he did not leave the hospital, he would be 
physically removed, to which Cornelsen again said, "Fuck you." (Tr., p.9, L.21 -
p.10, L.1.) Tomasini testified: 
And uh, so I tried to uh, I don't know which one of my arms I 
used, but I - I'm - made sure that I wasn't going to touch his - his right 
arm that was possibly damaged or hurt. And so I tried to get him on 
the shoulder to like turn him around and gesture for him to let's start 
goin' outside, and he just took his arm and, you know, swang [sic] off -
or basically hit my hand away. And so then I knew that it was gonna 
become physical, and uh, I waited till I could kinda maneuver off to his 
side a little bit so I could grab his left arm. And I grabbed his left arm, 
put it up behind his back and started takin' him outside. 
(Tr., p.10, Ls.3-14.) Tomasini put Cornelsen's arm behind his back as a "control 
technique," and explained that it "doesn't like inflict any pain on 'em or anything, and 
I actually made sure that I grabbed his arm that was not in the sling." (Tr., p.25, 
Ls.3-8.) 
As Tomasini directed Cornelsen through the first of two sets of double sliding 
glass doors, Cornelsen's mother approached Tomasini and told him to leave her son 
alone. (Tr., p.10, Ls.16-22.) Cornelsen then kicked Tomasini in the left leg, causing 
a long cut and bruise to Tomasini's leg. (Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.1; p.16, L.13 -
p.17, L.9; Plaintiff's Ex. 1.) Tomasini was able get Cornelsen outside the emergency 
room doors, and was assisted by another security officer, Austin Penya, in handling 
Cornelsen. (Tr., p.11, Ls.9-19.) Tomasini tried to calm Cornelsen down, but 
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Cornelsen pulled his reportedly injured right arm out of his sling and threatened to hit 
Tomasini a couple of times. (Tr., p.12, Ls.2-14.) After about five minutes, Tomasini 
and Penya agreed to allow Cornelsen back into the hospital on the condition he calm 
down and not swear, but as they began escorting Cornelsen back into the 
emergency room Cornelsen again started swearing just as a woman and a young 
child were walking out. (Tr., p.12, L.18 - p.13, L.9.) Tomasini told Cornelsen, 
"That's it, you're out of here," and Cornelsen "just started fighting, so a fight ensued." 
(Tr., p.13, Ls.15-17.) After a third security officer arrived, they were able to regain 
control of Cornelsen, and hospital personnel took him by wheelchair into a "quiet 
room" in the emergency room, where he eventually calmed down, admitting he 
"delivers papers because uh, he didn't get along well with people, that he uses the 
F-word, uh, often .... " (Tr., p.14, L.14 - p.16, L.5.) 
Nowland, who was working as a patient registrar in the hospital emergency 
room at the time of the incident, testified that when she checked Cornelsen into the 
emergency room, he was polite at first but became demanding and profane 
because, in his view, it was taking too long to be seen by medical staff. (Tr., p.29, 
L.5 - p.30, L.1.) Nowland testified that after a security officer asked Cornelsen to 
leave, he "was using the F-word." (Tr., p.32, Ls.2-6.) She heard the security officer 
ask Cornelsen to "step outside at least three times before telling him that if he didn't 
cooperate he'd have to take him out by force." (Tr., p.32, Ls.7-10.) Nowland 
watched as the security officer took Cornelsen out by the arm, and when they were 
in the middle of the two entrances to the emergency room, she saw Cornelsen kick 
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the officer, explaining, "I think it was a back kick, but I don't remember[,]" ... "[b]ut I 
saw a kick." (Tr., p.32, L.11 - p.33, L.10.) 
In determining if the evidence is substantial and competent, it will be 
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 
288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d 
at 1001. Substantial evidence is present when a "reasonable mind" could conclude 
that guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 
683-684, 99 P.3d 1069, 1073-1074 (2004). The magistrate court's finding that 
Cornelsen was guilty of battery, and that his conduct was not justified by self-
defense, is supported by Idaho's laws regarding trespass to property and self-
defense. 
Tomasini's conduct in leading Cornelsen by the arm out of the hospital was 
appropriate under Idaho's "trespass to property" laws. As a security officer 
employed by (i.e., an "agent" for) the hospital, Tomasini was entitled to evict 
Cornelsen from the hospital due to his profane and loud conduct. After Cornelsen 
indicated with certainty that he would not comply with Tomasini's repeated demands 
to leave the hospital premises, Tomasini was entitled to resort to a reasonable 
amount of physical force to remove him as a trespasser. In Tipsword v. Potter, 31 
Idaho 509, 174 P. 133, 134 (1918), the Idaho Supreme Court explained: 
In order to justify the use of force in ejecting a trespasser from 
premises where he entered peaceably, it must be shown that he was 
first requested to depart, and either that he refused to or did not 
comply with the request after being allowed a reasonable time to do 
so. 
9 
There is, however, evidence in the record sufficient to have 
warranted the jury in finding that respondent refused to leave at all. 
Appellant was therefore entitled to the instruction that, if respondent 
refused to leave upon demand, appellant had a right to eject him, using 
no more force than was reasonably necessary. 
See Cornell v. Harris, 60 Idaho 87, 88 P.2d 498, 501 (1939) (citing Tipsword for 
"[t]he general rule ... that the owner or one rightfully in possession of premises may, 
after requesting one who is illegally creating a disturbance therein to desist or leave, 
eject him resorting to force but using no more than is reasonably necessary."). 
Because of Cornelsen's loud, profane, and disturbing behavior, Tomasini 
repeatedly ordered him to leave the hospital, but instead of complying with 
Tomasini's demands, Cornelsen swore at him. At that point, Tomasini was entitled 
to physically evict Cornelsen as a trespasser "using no more force than was 
reasonably necessary." .kl Tomasini testified that he attempted to escort Cornelsen 
out of the hospital by taking his uninjured arm and moving it behind Cornelsen as a 
"control technique," and Nowland testified that she watched as Tomasini took 
Cornelsen "by the arm." (Tr., p.25, Ls.3-8; p.32, Ls.11-14.) Any "reasonable mind" 
could conclude that Tomasini's actions fall squarely within the use of reasonable 
force to evict Cornelsen from the hospital, and do not even constitute a technical 
battery, much less suffice to show an "imminent danger of bodily harm," as would be 
required in order to establish a claim of self-defense. Hoyle, 140 Idaho at 683-684, 
99 P.3d at 1073-1074; see ICJI 1517, n.4. 
Under the elements of self-defense, there is nothing about the way Tomasini 
escorted Cornelsen by the arm out of the hospital that would have caused Cornelsen 
to believe he was in imminent danger of bodily harm or that kicking Tomasini was 
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necessary to avoid such harm - much less that a reasonable person would hold 
those beliefs. See ICJI 1517, n.4. To the contrary, the trial record shows that 
Cornelsen was exceptionally angry and profanely demanding medical attention, and 
when Tomasini tried to escort him out of the hospital, he reacted out of anger and 
retribution by kicking the security officer in the leg. Any reasonable mind could have 
reached the same conclusions in convicting Cornelsen of battery. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 
at 683-684, 99 P.3d at 1073-1074. The district court properly affirmed the 
magistrate court's verdict that Cornelsen was guilty of battery, and its implicit finding 
that Cornelsen's conduct was not justified by self-defense. (Appellate Tr., p.28, 
Ls.1-5.) See State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 790, 979 P.2d 659, 663 (Ct. App. 
1999) ("There is evidentiary support for the district court's implied factual findings 
underlying its denial of Schevers'[s] motion to suppress the identification testimony"); 
State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 268, 858 P.2d 800, 807 (Ct. App. 1993). 
In sum, the district court correctly concluded that the magistrate judge's 
determination that Cornelsen's conduct constituted a battery despite his claim of 
self-defense is supported by substantial evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests this Court to affirm the district court's opinion affirming 
Cornelsen's conviction for battery. 
DATED this 6th day of June, 2013. 
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